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At the close of nearly a decade of managed floating exchange
rates, the U.S. dollar remains the world
ls primary international reserve
asset and vehicle currency. Some underlying macroeconomic characteristics
of the United States as the major reserve currency country have undergone a
marginal dimunition relative to other emerging reserve centers, and
noticeable currency diversification of private and official international
'li qui dfty has taken place. The underlying microfoundations of dollar
financial markets remain dominant, however, and continue to underpin the
U.S. currency in its reserve role.
In spite of efforts to introduce officially sponsored multiple
currency units such as the International Monetary Fund-s Special Drawing
Right into a larger role, these currency composites have met with only
limited success to date. One must look primarily to private markets for
the future evolution of the international financial system, and on this
basis it is likely that the dollar will remain most important.
The decade of the 1970
ls also witnessed a trend toward
privatization of international financial markets in general, at the expense
of the role formerly played by official lending agencies. This environment
also will likely reinforce the role of market forces in determining the
future course of the world monetary system.-2-
The term "dol lar overhanq" is one that frequently has appeared in
the literature of international finance in recent years. Although it is
sometimes not defined precisely, this usually refers to those private and
official dollar balances held by foreigners for international liquidity
purposes. There is some connotation in the phrase, however, that suggests
these dollars are held with some reluctance, and that the overhang is a
threat to international monetary stability. This;s of course not the case
in a world in which there is a demand for as well as a supply of
international liquidity.
The U.S. dollar has occupied center stage as an international
reserve, investment, and transactions currency throughout the post World
War II era. The period in which it rose to this status was one
characterized by fixed exchange rates and an absence of viable competitor
currencies. Other countries were lacking in the basic attributes of a
reserve center country~ and in an environment in which more stable
underlyi ng economic conditions enabled the extstence of fixed exchange
rates, there was 1itt1e tncentive for currency di versification to reduce
exchange rate risk. With the dollar fixed to gold and other currencies
fixed to the dollar, the position of the dollar was unique.
In the decade of the 1970's, however, several economic
developments challenged the role of the dollar as an international
currency. The overvaluation of the dollar, which developed in an
arrangement under which non-reserve center countries were obligated to
acquire unwanted dollar reserves by official intervention to fix their
currencies to the dollar, is sometimes argued to have been a cause for the
breakdown of the Bretton Woods adjustably fixed exchange rate system. But
a more telling reason for the marginal decline in the role of the dollar is-3-
the erosion of the reserve center country characteristics of the United
States which took place during the 1970' s. Intermittent periods of greater
perceived currency risk in the managed floating regime then provided
incentives for more currency diversification by both private and official
entities.
The follow; ng di scusston identifies both the microfoundations of
a reserve currency and the supporting macroeconomic characteristics of the
reserve center country. The prospects for reserve asset choice in the
future are assessed, with particular focus on the outlook for international
use of the dollar-.y
Microeconomic Foundations for a Reserve Currency
Private transactors and investors, as well as central banks,
choose the currencies they will trade in and hold according to the extent
to which each currency possesses certain attributes. In turn. the
likelihood that a given countrys currency will have these "reserve
currency characteristics" is a product of certain macroeconomic aspects of
the country itself, to be addressed in the following section.
Four critical attributes of a vehicle or reserve currency are:
1) convertabili ty and stabili ty, 2) a 1arge pool of primary transactions.
3} efficiency of the financial system, and 4} deep domestic and/or external
financial markets. The dollar dominated all other currencies historically
in providing these conditions and so established itself as the chief
international currency. Throughout most of the post World War II period,
only the British pound, other than the U.S. currency, had any substantial
reserve role at all.
Convertibility, or the assurance that free markets will continue
to exist in the currency. is the prime concern of international transactors-4-
deciding upon the currency denomination of their activities. This simply
reflects the exposure faced by an economic agent who lives, consumes and
trades ;n countries other than the one whose currency he holds. Even
currency ; nstabil i ty causes 1ess prob1ems than does a 1ass of
convert;bi 1ity) because instability can be insured against through forward
markets at a reasonable prjceo Long periods of volatiltty can also dampen
the des;rability of a currency for transact;ons purposes, however, because
of the increasing cost of insurance. Regarding official holdings, central
banks are 1ess 1; ke1y to cover the;r currency ho1di ngs ; n the forward
market since doing so may conflict with their official exchange
intervention policies. and it may be difficult to obtain forward cover on
such a large volume of holdings. Over the long run, a currency·s stability
depends importantly on the country's avoidance of high rates of inflation
relative to its trading partners.
A high level of commercial and financial transactions in a given
currency serves as a catalyst in the process of that currencys becoming a
vehicle. When there are many transactions that involve the assets of a
particular country, it is natural that the currency of that country be used
to denomi nate settlements, un1ess other crit ica1 factors di scourage its
use. The more transactions that can be conducted in a single currency the
less costly it is to use because conversion and covering costs are
reduced. Additionally. there is less risk in holding a widely used
currency because so many goods as well as other financial assets can be
exchanged for it. This relates to the reserve currency countrys world
trade role and its overall size as discussed below.
A large transactions volume also prompts the developrnent of an
efficient financial system. Such a system is characterized by full and-5-
i nmedi ate transmittal of ;nformati on as well as sophisti cated payments
mechanisms. This is an attribute of currencies that is particularly
important as transactors begin to demand immediate settlement of accounts,
conversion from time to transactions accounts, and exchange across
currenctes. Elaborate payments systems are 1ike1y to accompany a high
volume of transactions since these encourage their development.
Deep financial markets, finally, are an important attribute for a
vehicle currency because they insure liquidity and low margins.
Transactors holding assets or liabilities in a given currency need
assurance that there are well developed secondary markets for the assets
and that there ts sufficient volume in the liabilities' markets to keep
spreads reasonable and non-interest costs low. Standardization of terms
and maturities, which adds to liquidity and reduces spreads, is also most
complete in deep markets. Once again, the country's GNP and domestic
financial market size are related to these characteristics.
Macroeconomic Aspects of Reserve Currency Country Status
The macroeconomic characteristics of a country that are most
1i kely to produce a reserve role for its currency are 1) a commi tment to
price stability and economic growth, 2) a large share of total world trade,
3) a small trade/GNP ratio, 4) a large GNP, and 5) a sustainable outflow of
funds on the long-term capital account.
At the rudimentary level, a long-run policy commitment to both
economic growth and price stability by the potential reserve center country
can be crucial. It is not likely that other countries or private investors
will wish to accrue substantial reserve balances in a currency associated
with a secularly stagnant economy. But the commitment to a low inflation
rate can be even more important since domestic inflation leads to currency
depreciation and undermines the currency as a store of value.-6-
There are some aspects of a typical reserve center that make
independence from external considerations important. An economy which ; 5
relatively less vulnerable to fluctuations in foreign economic activity can
postpone adjustment and borrow to finance external payments deficits more
easily than can other countries. For this reason a low trade/GNP ratio ts
desirable. On the other hand, the more important a countrys trade is to
the rest of the world, the greater the likelihood that its currency will be
demanded as a medium of exchange for direct transactions with the country.
This demand easily spi 11 s over into transact;ons between third countries
because of global acceptability of the currency. A large trade votune is,
thus, a factor contributing to reserve country status.
The greater the relative overall economic size of the country as
measured by GNP, the greater its potential for conducting an active foreign
policy and maintaining a strong defense establishment. These aspects, and
a record of non-expropriation of foreign-owned funds, can play an important
role in determining the security of balances held in a given country. The
important characteristics of conver-t! bility and stabil tty, as discussed
above, relate to size as well as long run macropolicy.
The extent to which a country provides liquidity to the rest of
the world must be balanced by outflows elsewhere in the balance of
payments. and it is in thi s sense that a mono1ithic reserve center is
perforce a deficit country. Typical l.y, the reserve center I s financi a1
intermediary function is accomplished by borrowing short tenn and lending
long tenn in the external capital accounts. It is not likely that any
overall payments deficit will derive for a very extended period and in
substantial degree from a current account deficit. A persistent current
account deficit will likely reduce the desirability of a country's currency-7-
as a reserve asset. The heyday of the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency
was characterized by a current account surplus, offset by larger net
outflow in the longer-term capital accounts. (The current account surplus
may of course derive from such things as ; nvestment i ncone rather than
trade in goods. During the pre-1914 gold standard years when the pound
sterling was the major reserve currency. England often ran a merchandise
trade deficit accompanied by an overall current account surplus.)
The economies of scale that are important in national financial
market development are the same as those that make a financial center
important internationally. One national quality that facilitates
development and maintenance of a capital market is a relatively high level
of domestic savings re1ative to consumption. A substantia1 market in
government debt can a1so be important in estab1isht ng a reserve center
role. If abused secularly a government deficit can have detrimental
inflationary consequences, but the debt issue that finances the deficit can
provide volurre for domestic capital market development. Moreover, public
debt issues, particularly short-term instruments with little price risk,
have characteristics of security and liquidity that can appeal to both
private and official foreign entities, especially the latter.
Sophisticated capital markets can develop in economies that are
neither large absolutely nor relatively closed to the rest of the world. A
significant constraint on such economies, however, is the magnitude of
foreign capital flows relative to domestic liquidity. If the foreign
component of a country's monetary base is large relative to the domestic
component, for example, the domestic monetary authority may have more
difficulty sterilizing the impact of foreign flows into or out of its-8-
domestic markets, therefore surrendering some degree of monetary
independence.
The Dollar as a Reserve Currency
Because the dollar embodied these essential properties to a
greater extent than did any other currency in post-war years, it was drawn
into the role of the world
ls vehicle currency. Under the Bretton Woods
system, all major currencies were pegged to the dollar, which backed its
value with an assurance of gold convertibility at a guaranteed price (then
$35 per ounce). For several years, only the dollar was convertible against
any other currency. so that the dollar becane the vehicle currency of
i nternati ana1 payments. At the same time, the mass; ve reconstruct;on of
Europe and development of the rest of the world created a demand for U.S.
physical plant, other manufactured exports. and a supply of U.S. dollars as
a source of liquidity and reserves.
The bel fef in the strength of the U.S. economy and the stability
of the U. S. politica1 system fostered confidence in the value of the
dollar. which reinforced its status as the key international currency. The
sheer size. extent of development. and diversity of the U.S. financial
markets. together with the virtual assurance of free capital flows. then
sustained a major international role for the dollar. Despite the decline
in the value of the dollar and in the trade share of U.S. goods over the
last 20 years. the dollar has maintained its position as the key
international currency. But the extent of its domination clearly eroded
somewhat during the 1970' s. The relative importance of the dollar in
financing international trade and global activity can be gauged roughly by
the dollar share of the international business of major European banks.
The dollar share of the "Eurocurr-ency" market covered in Bank for-9-
International Settlements statistics, foreign currency denominated
liabilities of banks in eight European countries vis-a-vis nonresidents,
constituted about 69 percent of the market in 1980, down from 78 percent in
1970.
This erosion corresponded to a shift in reserve currency country
characteristics of the United States relative to the other potential
reserve centers. u.s. real GNP relative to the combined total of real GNPs
for the United States, West Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the United
K; ngdom, and France (those countries whose currenctes have been held ;n
greater or lesser amounts as reserves historically) declined to 49 percent
in 1980 from 61 percent in 1960. The period during which currency
diversification received the most attention, the late 1970
l s, also saw an
increase in the U.S. inflation rate corresponding to decreases in the
inflation rates of Germany, Japan, and Switzerland, whose currencies were
demanded increasingly by those diversifying out of dollars.
It is useful to focus upon official foreign exchange holdings,
since these are identifiable and because central monetary institutions'
portfolio incentives may reflect established private market trends.
Official International Monetary Fund statistics show some marginally
diminished role for dollar, a reduced role for the British pound which
partially shared the dollar1s reserve role in the postwar period, and
noticeable accretions for the German mark, Swiss franc, and Japanese yen.
From the first quarter of 1973, immediately prior to the final break with
fixed exchange rates, to the final quarter of 1979, the share of the U.S.
dollar in the Special Drawing Right denominated value of total official
foreign exchange dec1ined from 84.6 to 77.8 percent. Over the sene period
the pound-s sterling's share fell from 7.0 to 2.1 percent. The German-10-
mark's share rose from 5.8 to 11.7 psrcant, the Swiss franc's from 1.2 to
3.1 percent, and the Japanese yen's from a negligible amount to 3.6
percent. Much diversification of official foreign exchange reserves over
this interval can be attributed to oil producer and other outer countries'
portfolio management strategies. Those countries whose currencies were a
subject of diversification were able to diversify less themselves because
their monetary agencies were often forced to acquire the less demanded
dollars to stem the rise in their currencies.
The Potential for Artificial Currency Units
A frequently discussed alternative to dollar and non-dollar
reserve assets in recent years of managed floating has been man-made
composite units such as the International Monetary Fundts Special Drawing
Right (SOR) and the European Community's European Currency Unit (ECU).
These units have been proposed primarily as replacements for officially
held currency reserves, but progress in instituting them officially would
be enhanced by increased private use also. Through the early 1980
ls there
was only limited introduction of such units in denominating private
international financial instruments, although there is optimism in some
quarters that more progress will be made now in this area. The limited use
of official composite instruments follows the short-lived experience with
various privately concocted "currency cocktails" earlier in the managed
floating era. The SDR denominated subsitution account, intended to
consolidate outstanding official reserve balances under the auspices of the
1MF, failed to gain approval in 1980. Afterwards, attitudes shifted toward
looking primarily to private markets for progress in instituting the SDR as
"international money."-11-
Aside from technical and mechanical problems of instituting a
larger official role for such artificial units, several conceptual ones
exist. Individual central banks or private institutions could conceivably
assemble another superior currency portfolio for their own needs in terms
of yield, risk, and overall attractiveness. Moreover, adding a unit such
as the SDR to the already existing menu of potentialreserve assets might
not stem diversification among all of them, if SDR holdings were strictly
voluntary. Even the IMF has succumbed to changing the SDR's definition
periodically since its inception. The future for units such as the SDR in
private and official use may, however, be more optimistic in the
denomination of longer-term investments than in short-term liquidity.
These longer-tenn instruments may be converted before use for offici a1
intervention or other commitments; meanwhile the diversified basket does
provide some risk reduction.
Privatization of International Financial Markets
Some central banks are now managing their reserve portfolios more
like private funds managers might. In addition, the private market is
asserting greater influence on the international flows of capital, exchange
markets and money markets. It is important, therefore, to recognize that
the development of a reserve currency is a product largely of market
forces, not only of government desiqn, Cantinuing privatization wi 11
strengthen the role of the micro and macro factors mentioned above as
critica1 determi nants of reserve currency status. As such, privatization
will increase, not hamper, the predictability of shifts in the reserve
status of various currencies. In addition, the market will exert a strong
di sci p1 ine on governments of actual or potentia1 reserve currency
countries, not because the private system works against government policy-12-
but because it reflects changes in monetary, fiscal and exchange policies.
It is likely that the dollar will maintain its central role if the
privatization of international markets proceeds, depending upon the conduct
of overall economic policy in the United States and elsewhere. Two major
events during the 1970's drove the wedges which cracked open the barriers
to the privatization of the international financial markets. These events
were the demise of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and the
move to floating exchange rates in Ig73, and the OPEC shock of Ig73-74.
The advent of floating exchange rates signaled a decline in the role of
central banks in establishing exchange rates, and to an extent interest
rates, opening the door for market forces to prevail as capital controls
were reduced and cross country banking restrictions were eased.
The large payments imbalances created by the OPEC oil price hike
then provided additional impetus to the private markets. The deposits were
largely in dollars because the dollar markets were the only ones deep
enough to absorb such large deposits without severe disruption, and liquid
enough to support so much inward and outward investment. Deficit countries
also turned increasingly to the private market and away from the public
lenders. From 1975 to 1980, the total of new international Euro-bond
issues almost tripled. The largest percentage increases in borrowing came
fram private entities rather than state enterprises, governments, or
multinational organizations. The multinational agencies, such as the IMF
and World Bank, while able to make loans at lower explicit interest rates,
imposed high implicit costs on borrowers by requiring restructuring of
countries I domestic economic plans as prerequisites to most loans.
Meanwhile, the private market began to accommodate very large loans and to
reduce any single bank/ s risk by the syndication of loans and bond issues.-13-
These and other i nnovati ans furthered the move from pub1i c to private
financing. Table 3 depicts these growth trends through the mid to late
1970's. Atrend of general deregulation of financial markets can enhance a
move towards privatization. The U.S. took the lead, through laws such as
the Internatiana1 Banking Act of 1978 and the Depository lnstitutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, in moving domestive banking
markets more towards this orientation.
Conclusion
In spite of some trend toward diversification out of the dollar
in recent years, little in the above analysis suggests that the U.S.
currency will not still be the primary store of international liquidity in
foreign exchange reserves and private asset holdings. Although the dollar
will likely not be unchallenged, it will still playa key role in any
evolving multiple currency reserve asset system. Initially reluctant to
assume major reserve center responsibilities because of constraints placed
on their more open economies, the authorities in potential new reserve
centers during the 1ate 1970' s acquiesced to the point of acknowl edgi ng
some increased role for their currencies. For its part, the United States
stressed repeatedly its intention not to artificially perpetuate the
dollar's role, while at the same time noting inherent characteristics of
the dollar that would continue to make it important. Ultimately the
private market will determine the evolution of the international monetary
system.
Professional economic opinion remains divided at this juncture on
the potential stability of a multiple reserve system. It is not clear,
however, that a marginal dimunition of the dollar's role and an
encroachment by other currencies wi 11 1ead to i nstabiltty, A system-14-
characterized by competition among several reserve centers can conceivably
be just as stable as one with a monopoly center. Especially when the
change is more of degree than kind, from a system with quite small
non-dollar holdings to one with greater official and private portfolio
ba1ance, it ;salso not clear that any transiti on wi 11 be that traumattc.
Addition of more assets than those considered as candidates now might even
make the system more stable. This remains an important topic for future
international monetary research.FOOTNOTE
1. For a relatively recent more extended treatment of reserve asset
choice, see C. Fred Bergsten, The Dilemmas of the Dollar: The Economics and
Politics of United States International Monetary Policy (New York: Council
on Foreign Relations Press, 1975), and references cited therein. Analysis
of the reserve role of the U.S. dollar relative to other currencies and to
other composite officially created reserve assets may be found in H. Robert
Heller and Malcolm Knight, Reserve Currency Preferences of Central Banks,
Princeton Essays in International Finance, No. 131 (Princeton, N.J.:
International Finance Section, Princeton University. 1978) and Thomas D.
Willett, International Liguidity Issues (Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980).